Beyond Functional Architecture in Cognitive Neuropsychology: A Reply to
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We (Patterson & Plaut, 2009) argued that cognitive neuropsychology has had a limited impact on cognitive science due to a nearly exclusive reliance on (a) single-case studies, (b) dissociations in cognitive performance, and (c) shallow, box-and-arrow theorizing, and we advocated adopting a case-series methodology, considering associations as well as dissociations, and employing explicit computational modeling in studying "how the brain does its cognitive business." In reply, Coltheart (2010) claims that our concern is misplaced because cognitive neuropsychology is concerned only with studying the mind, in terms of its "functional architecture," without regard to how this is implemented in the brain. In this response, we do not dispute his characterization of cognitive neuropsychology as it has typically been practiced over the last 40 years, but we suggest that our understanding of brain structure and function has advanced to the point where studying the mind without regard to the brain is unwise and perpetuates the field's isolation.
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