Geographical Estimates are Explained by Perceptual Simulation and Language Statistics

Geographical Estimates are Explained by Perceptual Simulation and Language Statistics Richard Tillman (rntllman@memphis.edu) Department of Psychology/ Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of Memphis 365 Innovation Drive, Memphis, TN 38152 USA Sterling Hutchinson (schtchns@memphis.edu) Department of Psychology/ Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of Memphis 365 Innovation Drive, Memphis, TN 38152 USA Max M. Louwerse (maxlouwerse@gmail.com) Department of Psychology/ Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of Memphis 365 Innovation Drive, Memphis, TN 38152 USA Tilburg Centre for Cognition and Communication (TiCC), Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands Abstract Several studies have demonstrated that language encodes geographical information. That is, the relative longitude and latitude of city locations can be extracted from language. Whether people actually rely on these linguistic features is less clear. Recent studies have suggested that language statistics plays a role in geographical estimates, but these studies rely on map drawings, a fundamentally perceptual task. The current study investigated the extent to which people rely on map representations and statistical linguistic frequencies by using a linguistic task. Participants saw U.S. city pairs in their iconic positions (a more northern city is presented above a more southern city, or a more western city is presented to the left of a more eastern city), and in their reverse-iconic positions (a more southern city is presented above a more northern city, or a more eastern city is presented to the left of a more western city). For iconic city pairs both in the east – west (Seattle – Boston) and north – south (Memphis – Miami) configurations, RTs were determined by the iconicity. No effect was obtained for statistical linguistic frequencies. However, when city pairs were presented in a reverse-iconic configuration, for both horizontal (Boston – Seattle) and vertical (Miami – Memphis) orientations, both perceptual and linguistic factors explained RTs. These findings support the idea that cognition relies on a shallow heuristic, a linguistic system, and a fine-grained and more precise perceptual simulation system. Keywords: embodied cognition; geography; spatial cognition symbolic cognition; Introduction Is San Francisco close to New York? Is Boston close to Miami? Judging the distance between cities can be approached in more than one way. This judgment can be deep and precise, as with perceptual simulation, or quick and shallow, as with symbolic representation. For instance, humans can make geographical estimates on the basis of their perceptual experiences from locomotion and stationary viewing, from static pictorial representations, such as diagrams, paintings and photos, provided on a map, and they can acquire information via dynamic pictorial representations, including animations, and videos (Freundschuh & Mercer, 1995). The importance of a perceptual simulation system has been strongly advocated by accounts of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Semin & Smith, 2008). According to Barsalou, Solomon, and Wu (1999), perceptual states are transferred into memory and function symbolically, rather than an arbitrary representation such as language. As an example, overwhelming evidence in favor of an embodied cognition account has accumulated, showing that processing within modalities is faster than having to map across modalities, and suggesting that modality switching comes at a price (e.g., Marques, 2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003; Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). Furthermore, language comprehension seems to be influenced by action representations primed in experimental tasks (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak et al., 2005; Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Doherty, 1989; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002), and visual representations get activated during language comprehension (see also Boroditsky, 2000; Fincher-Kiefer, 2001; Matlock, Ramscar, & Boroditsky, 2005). One particular study nicely illustrates the embodied cognition account. Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) presented iconic word pairs either as they occur in the real world, such as attic over basement, or the reverse-iconic orientation, such as basement over attic. They found significant differences between the iconic and reverse-iconic configurations of these word pairs. They concluded that the explanation for the iconicity effect was that words activate their perceptual representations (attics presented above basements are processed faster than basements above attics, because of their iconic relationship in the real world).