What could be objective about probabilities

Abstract The basic notion of an objective probability is that of a probability determined by the physical structure of the world. On this understanding, there are subjective credences that do not correspond to objective probabilities, such as credences concerning rival physical theories. The main question for objective probabilities is how they are determined by the physical structure. In this paper, I survey three ways of understanding objective probability: stochastic dynamics, humean chances, and deterministic chances (typicality). The first is the obvious way to understand the probabilities of quantum mechanics via a collapse theory such as GRW, the last is the way to understand the probabilities in the context of a deterministic theory such as Bohmian mechanics. Humean chances provide a more abstract and general account of chances locutions that are independent of dynamical considerations.

[1]  B. Loewer David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance , 2004, Philosophy of Science.

[2]  M. P. Unterweger,et al.  Comprehensive Review and Critical Evaluation of the Half-Life of Tritium , 2000, Journal of research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

[3]  B. Loewer Determinism and Chance , 2001 .

[4]  D. Dürr,et al.  Quantum equilibrium and the origin of absolute uncertainty , 1992, quant-ph/0308039.

[5]  John Earman,et al.  A Primer on Determinism , 1986 .

[6]  David Z. Albert,et al.  Time and Chance , 2000 .