Framing Contingencies ∗

The subjective likelihood of a contingency often depends on the manner in which it is described to the decision maker. To accommodate this dependence, we introduce a model of decision making under uncertainty which takes as primitive a family of preferences indexed by partitions of the state space. Each partition corresponds to a description of the state space. We characterize the following partition-dependent expected utility representation. The decision maker has a nonadditive set function ν over events. Given a partition of the state space, she computes expected utility with respect to her partition-dependent belief, which weights each cell in the partition by ν. Nonadditivity of ν allows the probability of an event to depend on the way in which the state space is described. We propose behavioral definitions for those events which are transparent to the decision maker and those which are completely overlooked, and connect these definitions to conditions on the representation. ∗This paper supersedes an earlier draft titled “Unawareness and Framing.” Comments from anonymous referees, Eddie Dekel, Raphaël Giraud, and Todd Sarver were very helpful. Klaus Nehring deserves special thanks for discovering and carefully explaining the relationship between binary bet acyclicity and the product rule to us, leading to the material in Section 4.4. We thank the National Science Foundation for financial support under Grants SES-0550224 and SES-0835944. †Department of Economics, University of California, 508-1 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880. Email: dahn@econ.berkeley.edu. ‡Department of Economics, Washington University in Saint Louis, Campus Box 1208, Saint Louis, MO 63130. Email: hergin@artsci.wustl.edu.

[1]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated Failure Probabilities to Problem Representation , 2005 .

[2]  Klaus Nehring,et al.  Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework , 1999 .

[3]  Yuval Rottenstreich,et al.  Typical versus atypical unpacking and superadditive probability judgment. , 2004, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[4]  Uday S. Karmarkar,et al.  Subjectively weighted utility: A descriptive extension of the expected utility model , 1978 .

[5]  A. Tversky,et al.  Weighing Risk and Uncertainty , 1995 .

[6]  F. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays , 2001 .

[7]  A. Tversky,et al.  Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment , 1983 .

[8]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Non-transitive measurable utility for decision under uncertainty , 1989 .

[9]  R. Pieters,et al.  Working Paper , 1994 .

[10]  Rebecca K. Ratner,et al.  How subjective grouping of options influences choice and allocation: diversification bias and the phenomenon of partition dependence. , 2005, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[11]  J. Quiggin A theory of anticipated utility , 1982 .

[12]  I. Simonson The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior , 1990 .

[13]  Framing effects as violations of extensionality , 2009 .

[14]  Sujoy Mukerji,et al.  Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model , 1997 .

[15]  Aldo Rustichini,et al.  Recent developments in modeling unforeseen contingencies , 1998 .

[16]  E. Özbay Unawareness and strategic announcements in games with uncertainty , 2007, TARK '07.

[17]  Paolo Ghirardato,et al.  Coping with ignorance: unforeseen contingencies and non-additive uncertainty , 2001 .

[18]  Klaus Nehring Capacities And Probabilistic Beliefs: A Precarious Coexistence , 1999 .

[19]  Massimo Marinacci,et al.  Coarse contingencies and ambiguity , 2007 .

[20]  C. Fox Strength of Evidence, Judged Probability, and Choice Under Uncertainty , 1999, Cognitive Psychology.

[21]  I. Gilboa,et al.  Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior , 1989 .

[22]  Robert T. Clemen,et al.  Subjective Probability Assessment in Decision Analysis: Partition Dependence and Bias Toward the Ignorance Prior , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[23]  Barton L. Lipman,et al.  REPRESENTING PREFERENCES WITH A UNIQUE SUBJECTIVE STATE SPACE , 2001 .

[24]  D. Schmeidler Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity , 1989 .

[25]  F. J. Anscombe,et al.  A Definition of Subjective Probability , 1963 .

[26]  J. Jaffray,et al.  Rational Behavior under Complete Ignorance , 1980 .

[27]  G. Loewenstein,et al.  Diversification bias: Explaining the discrepancy in variety seeking between combined and separated choices , 1995 .

[28]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk — Source link , 2007 .

[29]  A. Tversky,et al.  Heuristics and Biases: Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory , 2002 .

[30]  David M. Kreps A REPRESENTATION THEOREM FOR "PREFERENCE FOR FLEXIBILITY" , 1979 .

[31]  A. Tversky,et al.  Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability. , 1994 .

[32]  Craig R. Fox,et al.  Partition Priming in Judgment Under Uncertainty , 2003, Psychological science.

[33]  Rebecca K. Ratner,et al.  Choosing less-preferred experiences for the sake of variety. , 1999 .