Policy Dilemmas in Financing Long‐term Care in Europe

Long-term care (LTC) is the largest insurable risk facing the elderly in most western societies. Paradoxically, institutional responses to the need to insure ex-ante (before the contingency occurs) the financial risks of needing LTC (by means of social and private insurance and self-insurance) exhibit limited development. In contrast, mechanisms to finance LTC ex-post continue to develop, primarily those supported by the public sector (by means of subsidies or tax deductions) and the family (by means of intergenerational transfers). Both ex-ante and ex-post types of financing mechanisms are found to be subject to shortcomings which give rise to dilemmas for public policy. Governments confront these dilemmas in different ways, causing a great deal of heterogeneity in the financing and provision of LTC services across Europe. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

[1]  Joan Costa-Font,et al.  Financing Long-Term Care: Ex-Ante, Ex-Post or Both? , 2014, Health economics.

[2]  Joan Costa-Font,et al.  Crowding Out of Long-Term Care Insurance: Evidence from European Expectations Data , 2014, Health economics.

[3]  P. Zweifel,et al.  Bilateral Intergenerational Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence from China , 2014 .

[4]  P. Zweifel.  The Division of Labor Between Private and Social Insurance , 2013 .

[5]  L. Eeckhoudt,et al.  On insuring and caring for parents' long-term care needs. , 2012, Journal of health economics.

[6]  Francesca Colombo,et al.  Help Wanted? Fair and Sustainable Financing of Long‐term Care Services , 2012 .

[7]  R. Frank.  Long-term Care Financing in the United States: Sources and Institutions , 2012 .

[8]  Joan Costa-i-Font,et al.  Financing long-term care in Europe: institutions, markets and models , 2011 .

[9]  Sue Thomas.  Commission on Funding of Care and Support: the Dilnot report , 2011 .

[10]  P. Zweifel,et al.  Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use , 2011 .

[11]  F. Colombo.  Help wanted? : providing and paying for long-term care , 2011 .

[12]  Joan Costa-Font.  Family ties and the crowding out of long-term care insurance , 2010 .

[13]  N. Barr.  Long‐term Care: A Suitable Case for Social Insurance , 2010 .

[14]  Joan Costa-Font,et al.  Housing Wealth and Housing Decisions in Old Age: Sale and Reversion , 2010 .

[15]  D. Stevenson,et al.  The complementarity of public and private long-term care coverage. , 2010, Health affairs.

[16]  Joan Costa-Font,et al.  Does ‘early purchase’ improve the willingness to pay for long-term care insurance? , 2009 .

[17]  Amy N. Finkelstein.  The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance in the United States: A Review of the Evidence , 2009 .

[18]  Jeffrey R. Brown,et al.  The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance in the U.S.: A Review of the Evidence. , 2009, The Journal of risk and insurance.

[19]  Yves Jorens,et al.  Long term care in the European union , 2008 .

[20]  Jeffrey R. Brown,et al.  Why Is the Market or Long-term Care Insurance So Small? , 2007 .

[21]  Klaus M. Schmidt,et al.  The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. , 2005 .

[22]  T. Philipson,et al.  The Rise in Old Age Longevity and the Market for Long-Term Care , 1998, The American economic review.

[23]  Liliana E. Pezzin,et al.  Intergenerational Household Formation, Female Labor Supply and Informal Caregiving A Bargaining Approach , 1999 .

[24]  K. Jung.  Influence of the Introduction of a Per-Visit Copayment on Health Care Use and Expenditures: The Korean Experience , 1998 .

[25]  P. Zweifel,et al.  Long-Term Care Insurance in a Two-Generation Model , 1998 .

[26]  P. Zweifel,et al.  Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships , 1996 .

[27]  Long-term care insurance and trust saving in a two-generation model. , 1996, Developments in health economics and public policy.