Towards a model of storage jamming

Storage jamming can degrade real-world activities that share stored data. Storage jamming is not prevented by access controls or cryptographic techniques. Verification to rule out storage jamming logic is impractical for shrink-wrapped software or low-cost custom applications. Detection mechanisms do offer more promise. In this paper, we model storage jamming and a detection mechanism, using Unity logic. We find that Unity logic, in conjunction with some high-level operators, models storage jamming in a natural way and allows us to reason about susceptibility, rate of jamming, and impact on persistent values.

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