On Providing Confidentiality for Link State Network Routing Protocol

In current network routing domain, routing information lacks protection b ased on confidentiality. This makes network routing vulnerable to many types of security attacks. In this paper , w present a framework to provide confidentiality for link state routing protocol. This framework involves crea tion of a trust structure among routers and key management. The routing information is encrypted, so that it can be accessed only by authorized routers. We present an implementation framework for our approach by extendin g Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) intradomain routing protocol. Based on our performance assessment of th e routers, we infer that the additional cost in implementing this scheme does not bring down the overall performance.

[1]  John Moy,et al.  OSPF Protocol Analysis , 1991, RFC.

[2]  John Moy,et al.  OSPF Version 2 , 1998, RFC.

[3]  Brian Wellington,et al.  OSPF with Digital Signatures , 1997, RFC.

[4]  John Moy,et al.  OSPF Standardization Report , 1998, RFC.

[5]  William Stallings,et al.  Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice , 1998 .

[6]  Alfred V. Aho,et al.  Hierarchical networks and the LSA N-squared problem in OSPF routing , 2000, Globecom '00 - IEEE. Global Telecommunications Conference. Conference Record (Cat. No.00CH37137).

[7]  A. Basu,et al.  Stability issues in OSPF routing , 2001, SIGCOMM '01.

[8]  Albert G. Greenberg,et al.  Experience in black-box OSPF measurement , 2001, IMW '01.

[9]  Deep Medhi,et al.  QoS routing computation with path caching: a framework and network performance , 2002, IEEE Commun. Mag..

[10]  Deep Medhi,et al.  A key-chain-based keying scheme for many-to-many secure group communication , 2004, TSEC.