A Secure and Fair Double Auction Framework for Cloud Virtual Machines

Double auction is one of the most promising solutions to allocate virtual machine (VM) resources in two-sided cloud markets, which can increase the utilization rate of VM resources. However, most cloud auction mechanisms simply assume that the auctioneer is fully trusted while ignoring bid-privacy preservation and trade fairness in the process of auction. Previous studies have indicated that some cryptographic tools can be used to resolve the above issues, but the poor performance makes those techniques difficult to practice. In this paper, we propose a Secure and Fair Double AuCtion framework (named SF-DAC) for cloud virtual machines, which performs cloud auction efficiently while guaranteeing both bid privacy and trade fairness. We design secure 3-party computation protocols that support secure comparison and secure sorting, which enable us to construct a secure double auction scheme that outperforms all prior comparable solutions. Furthermore, we propose a fair trading mechanism based on smart contracts to prevent the bidders from halting the auction without financial penalties. The extensive experiments demonstrate that SF-DAC achieves an order of magnitude reduction in computation and communication costs than prior arts.

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