k-anycast game in selfish networks

Conventionally, the majority of network routing protocols assume that every network terminal or link forwards data for others without any deviation. However, this may not be true when the terminals or links are owned by individual selfish users, who always tries to maximize their own benefits instead of faithfully following a prescribed protocol. In this paper, we propose a new routing protocol, called k-anycast routing, that works well even if network links (or terminals or both) are selfish. In our protocol, the source node first finds a tree that spans k receivers out of a set of possible receivers and pay the relay links to compensate their costs. We prove that every relay link follows the routing protocol: it maximizes its profit when it declares its actual cost

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