On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
暂无分享,去创建一个
Bidding the same price in descending bid auctions and in first price sealed bid auctions is equivalent to expected utility maximizing behavior, and this is equivalent to dynamically consistent bidding. The claim that, in strategic form, descending bid and first price sealed bid auctions are the same game is thus shown to be false, since the mapping from strategies to payoffs is not the same for the two auction forms.
[1] J. Hadamard. La Notion de Différentielle dans l'Enseignement , 1935 .
[2] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .
[3] The Allais Paradox, Dutch Auctions, and Alpha-Utility Theory , 1982 .
[4] Zvi Safra,et al. Ascending bid auctions with behaviorally consistent bidders , 1989 .
[5] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .