Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox
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Amnon Rapoport | Eyran J. Gisches | Subhasish Dugar | Tamar Kugler | A. Rapoport | Tamar Kugler | Subhasish Dugar
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