Dynamic Load Altering Attacks Against Power System Stability: Attack Models and Protection Schemes

Dynamic load altering attacks (D-LAAs) are introduced as a new class of cyber-physical attacks against smart grid demand response programs. The fundamental characteristics of D-LAAs are explained. Accordingly, D-LAAs are classified in terms of open-loop versus closed-loop attacks, single-point versus multi-point attacks, the type of feedback, and the type of attack controller. A specific closed-loop D-LAA against power system stability is formulated and analyzed, where the attacker controls the changes in the victim load based on a feedback from the power system frequency. A protection system is designed against D-LAAs by formulating and solving a non-convex pole-placement optimization problem. Uncertainty with respect to attack sensor location is addressed. Case studies are presented to assess system vulnerabilities, impacts of single-point and multi-point attacks, and optimal load protection in an IEEE 39 bus test system.

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