Stability of multipacket slotted Aloha with selfish users and perfect information

Aloha is perhaps the simplest and most-studied medium access control protocol in existence. Only in the recent past, however, have researchers begun to study the performance of Aloha in the presence of selfish users. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model of multipacket slotted Aloha with perfect information. We show that this model must have an equilibrium and we characterize this equilibrium. Using the tools of stochastic processes, we then establish the equilibrium stability region for some well-known channel models.

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