A Lightweight Security Technique For Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Against GPS Spoofing Attack

The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in military and civil applications is increased in recent years. These UAVs are generally equipped with a set of sensors and follow a predefined trajectory. The regions of deployment are usually hostile environments and inaccessible such as disaster zone or military fields. Therefore, to accomplish their mission, the UAVs need to communicate with each other, with the Ground Control Station (GCS) and with the navigation satellite system. Through these infrastructures, the UAVs are prone and vulnerable to various cyber-attacks such as GPS spoofing. This attack can be launched easily by an attacker using a simple transmitter by broadcasting fake and wrong GPS signals. These signals can mislead UAVs that receive them from their initial trajectory. In order to ensure the predefined UAV's mission, detecting GPS spoofing attacks is a real challenge and permits to get a high level of flight security, high reliability, and schedule maintenance in time. In this research, we model this issue using a Bayesian network in order to detect this type of attack, and then, the model analyzes and detects the fake GPS signal data. The preliminary results that our proposal provides are promising in terms of a set of metrics.