Two general classes in creative problem-solving? An account based on the cognitive processess involved in the problem structure - representation structure relationship.

The creative problem-solving performed by natural cognitive systems includes a wide variety of tasks of different degrees of difficulty. A classification of creative problems in two broad categories is proposed, based on problem structuredness and the cognitive processes used in regulating the problem structure-representation structure relationship in creative problem-solving. A cognitive theoretical framework is used to exemplify the difference in cognitive processes participation in these two classes of creative problemsolving.

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