On a class of solidarity values

We suggest a new one-parameter family of solidarity values for TU-games. The members of this class are distinguished by the type of player whose removal from a game does not affect the remaining players’ payoffs. While the Shapley value and the equal division value are the boundary members of this family, the solidarity value is its center. With exception of the Shapley value, all members of this family are asymptotically equivalent to the equal division value in the sense of Radzik (2013).

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