Extensive games with possibly unaware players

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they may not be aware of moves that they and other agents can make. We show how such games can be represented; the key idea is to describe the game from the point of view of every agent at every node of the game tree. We provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and show that every game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we extend these results to games with awareness of unawareness, where a player i may be aware that a player j can make moves that i is not aware of.

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