Approximately optimal mechanism design: motivation, examples, and lessons learned

This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate two basic questions in auction theory. First, when is complexity --- in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge --- an essential feature of revenue-maximizing single-item auctions? Second, do combinatorial auctions require high-dimensional bid spaces to achieve good social welfare?

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