论文信息 - Cooperation in the long-run

Cooperation in the long-run

Abstract The long-run behavior of economic and biological processes is often dramatically altered when stochastic influences are taken into account. In fact, the smaller the noise, the more drastic the change can be. This seemingly paradoxical point is illustrated with the evolution of cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.

H. Peyton Young | Dean P. Foster | Dean Phillips Foster | H. Young

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