论文信息 - Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts

Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts

Two solution concepts for games without sidepayments are considered: the stable bargaining solution proposed by Harsanyi [6, 7], and the A-transfer value first proposed by Shapley [19]. Some examples of games are considered for which both solution concepts yield results which are highly counter-intuitive, and which seem to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the games are played by rational players.

A. Roth

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