Telling the Truth (Up to a Point): Radio Communication Among Maine Lobstermen

This paper tests several predictions about radio communications among Maine lobstermen. Previous studies have predicted extreme secrecy and deceit in this fishery because of the high economic costs of sharing information on the location of lobsters. The predictions of this paper, however, are based on both the economic costs of sharing information and the social costs of secrecy or deceit. Since both of these costs are high in the study area, only a moderate amount of secrecy, and even less deceit, was predicted. It was also predicted that secrecy would increase during times of good fishing when sharing information would be most costly, but only in a way not likely to damage social relationships. That is, communication about catch size would continue, but in a less specific form. Codings of 442 communications over an eleven-week period supported these predictions, suggesting that the value of social relationships among fishermen is an important variable in studies of information sharing.