Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices

This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a contingent future auction is characterized, including a sufficient condition for existence of an invertible (increasing symmetric pure-strategy) bidding equilibrium that facilitates the seller’s learning. A unique invertible bidding equilibrium exists for the Dutch auction format, but only when the second auction is sufficiently discounted by the bidders. In the equilibrium, high-valuation bidders shade their bids down as if the second auction were guaranteed. To counter such strategic bidding, the seller would value ex-ante commitment to hold the second auction less often. Three forms of such commitment are analyzed: commitment to list future auctions in advance, commitment to not hold the second auction unless the first price exceeds a publicly announced threshold, and commitment to a reserve-price in the second auction.

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