Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions

We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence the success of players in the other network. We find that the stronger the bias in the utility function, the higher the level of public cooperation. Yet the benefits of enhanced public cooperation on the two networks are just as biased as the utility functions themselves. While cooperation may thrive on one network, the other may still be plagued by defectors. Nevertheless, the aggregate level of cooperation on both networks is higher than the one attainable on an isolated network. This positive effect of biased utility functions is due to the suppressed feedback of individual success, which leads to a spontaneous separation of characteristic time scales of the evolutionary process on the two interdependent networks. As a result, cooperation is promoted because the aggressive invasion of defectors is more sensitive to the slowing-down than the build-up of collective efforts in sizable groups.

[1]  G. Szabó,et al.  Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games , 2006, q-bio/0610001.

[2]  Raymond E. Goldstein,et al.  Topological constraints and their breakdown in dynamical evolution , 2012 .

[3]  宁北芳,et al.  疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A , 2005 .

[4]  Yamir Moreno,et al.  Complex Cooperative Networks from Evolutionary Preferential Attachment , 2008, PloS one.

[5]  M. Perc.  Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack , 2009, 0902.4661.

[6]  F. C. Santos,et al.  Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations. , 2006, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[7]  Daniele Vilone,et al.  Disentangling social and group heterogeneities: Public Goods games on complex networks , 2011, ArXiv.

[8]  J. Gómez-Gardeñes,et al.  Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population , 2009, 0907.2649.

[9]  R. Rosenfeld.  Nature , 2009, Otolaryngology--head and neck surgery : official journal of American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery.

[10]  V. Latora,et al.  Complex networks: Structure and dynamics , 2006 .

[11]  Long Wang,et al.  Individual's expulsion to nasty environment promotes cooperation in public goods games , 2009 .

[12]  Beom Jun Kim,et al.  Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: prisoners' dilemma game in small-world networks. , 2002, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[13]  Eric Smith,et al.  The compositional and evolutionary logic of metabolism , 2012, Physical biology.

[14]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game , 2008, 0811.4372.