论文信息 - Nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold

Nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold

Abstract I'll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I'll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and compare them to these two standard systems.

James Hawthorne | James Hawthorne

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