DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICIES ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS

A fundamental overhaul of EU economic governance is needed. The most important reform is a strengthening of national fiscal frameworks, including the establishment of independent fiscal watchdogs in Member States that do not yet have such institutions. At the European level, a permanent crisis resolution mechanism should be integrated with both broader macroeconomic surveillance and the sanction system. An independent European fiscal council could, based on macroeconomic risk considerations, decide in advance appropriate haircuts in the event of future sovereign debt restructuring.

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