Information flow inference for ML

This paper presents a type-based information flow analysis for a call-by-value λ-calculus equipped with references, exceptions and let-polymorphism, which we refer to as ML. The type system is constraint-based and has decidable type inference. Its noninterference proof is reasonably light-weight, thanks to the use of a number of orthogonal techniques. First, a syntactic segregation between values and expressions allows a lighter formulation of the type system. Second, noninterference is reduced to subject reduction for a nonstandard language extension. Lastly, a semi-syntactic approach to type soundness allows dealing with constraint-based polymorphism separately.

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