Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition

Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.

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