KANT ON IMPERFECT DUTY AND SUPEREROGATION

In his Metapbysics of Morals Kant presents the outlines of a System of moral principles. The Categorical Imperative is still the supreme principle of morality, but it is seen äs guiding conduct only by means of intermediate principles. These principles are divided into several types, and how a given principle can be justified and applied depends upon which type of principle it is. In discussing these divisions, I have a general aim and a special one. The general aim is to clarify and reconstruct some of Kant's main distinctions among the types of duty and to show how, on Kant's view, the moral worth of actions varies accordingly. What Kant says on these matters is often unclear, but the attempt to reconstruct the main lines of his thought uncovers a set of distinctions more complex and coherent than commentaries typically lead one to expect. The special aim is to show, on the basis of these distinctions, that Kant has a place in his moral scheme for supererogatory actions. Several philosophers have recently criticized Kant's ethics for not allowing for supererogation. Some belieye that for Kant all actions are either forbidden or obligatory.* Another allows that Kant has a place for the morally indifferent and even for acts which are somewhat bad though not forbidden, but not for the supererogatory. I shall argue that these interpretations, though suggested by some of Kant's remarks, are mistaken. If I am right, Kant's ethics is less rigoristic than commonly thought. There is more room for choice in pursuing moral ideals, and not everything good is required. My remarks are divided äs fojlows. First, I give an account of Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. This is the most controversial of Kant's divisions of moral principles and the most important one for my purposes. Second, I discuss more briefly juridical duty, ethical duty, and some sub-divisions of the latter. The main elements of all these concepts are then represented in a more systematic, though somewhat simplified, manner. Third, I attempt to clarify the complex way in which Kant attributes moral worth