Consent or Conflict: Coevolution of Coordination and Networks

Societies are sometimes divided into groups that behave in different ways or have strongly opposing opinions. At other times, everyone seems to behave according to similar principles and opinions. It is likely that individual decisions on behavior or opinions are affected by social networks through influence and selection processes. However, the outcomes are not necessarily optimal for the society as a whole. Two types of problems might arise: (a) polarization of the society into two camps that do not reach consensus, possibly leading to conflict; (b) actors choosing suboptimal behavior, because changing behavior is too risky if done unilaterally. Simulations show that if a society is rather segregated initially, there exists a heightened probability that this situation will worsen. The effect of network density is twofold. First, density has a positive effect on reaching a uniform opinion and, therefore, decreases the likelihood of polarization. Second, density increases the likelihood that actors do not change their behavior, worsening the inefficiency of already suboptimal initial situations.

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