Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation

This article argues that doing anthropology means comparing anthropologies. Comparison is not just our primary analytic tool, it is also our raw material and our ultimate grounding, since what we compare are always and necessarily, in one form or other, comparisons. If, as Marilyn Strathern suggests, culture consists in the way people draw analogies between different domains of their worlds, then every culture is a multidimensional process of comparison. Likewise, if anthropology studies culture through culture, then, following Roy Wagner, whatever operations characterize our investigations must also be general properties of culture. Intracultural relations, or internal comparisons, and intercultural relations, or external comparisons, are in strict ontological continuity. But direct comparability does not necessarily signify immediate translatability, just as ontological continuity does not imply epistemological transparency. How can we restore the analogies traced by, say, indigenous Amazonian peoples within the terms of our own analogies? What happens to our comparisons when we compare them with indigenous comparisons? The perspective advocated here is that of perspectivism and controlled equivocation. Este artigo sustenta que fazer antropologia e comparar antropologias. A comparacao nao e apenas nosso instrumento de analise primario; ela e tambem nossa materia-prima e nosso contexto ultimo. Pois o que comparamos sao sempre, de uma forma ou de outra, comparacoes. Se, como sugere Marilyn Strathern, a cultura consiste no modo pelo qual as pessoas estabelecem analogias entre diferentes dominios de seus mundos, entao cada cultura e um processo multidimensional de comparacao. Da mesma forma, se a antropologia estuda a cultura atraves da cultura, entao, como observa Roy Wagner, as operacoes que caracterizam nossa investigacao —sejam elas quais forem—devem ser tambem propriedades gerais da cultura. As relacoes intraculturais, ou comparacoes internas, e as relacoes interculturais, ou comparacoes externas, estao em estrita continuidade ontologica. Mas a comparabilidade direta nao significa necessariamente tradutibilidade imediata, assim como a continuidade ontologica nao significa transparencia epistemologica. Como podemos restituir as analogias estabelecidas por, digamos, os povos indigenas amazonicos nos termos de nossas proprias analogias? O que acontece com nossas comparacoes quando as comparamos com as comparacoes indigenas? A perspectiva que aqui se advoga e a do perspectivismo e a da equivocacao controlada. ∗This essay was presented as the keynote address at the meetings of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America (SALSA), held at Florida International University, Miami, January 17–18, 2004. 3 Tipiti (2004) 2(1):3–22 © 2004 SALSA ISSN 1545-4703 Printed in USA Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation1 EDUARDO VIVEIROS DE CASTRO Museu Nacional, Rio de Janeiro Tropical Americanism has proven to be one of the most dynamic and creative areas of contemporary anthropology, exerting a growing influence on the wider conceptual agenda. Yet despite this flourishing, and although the fundamental work of Levi-Strauss—within which Amerindian thought is given pride of place—has already been in circulation for more than half a century, the radical originality of the contribution of the continent’s peoples to humanity’s intellectual heritage has yet to be fully absorbed by anthropology. More particularly, some of the implications of this contribution for anthropological theory itself are still waiting to be drawn. This is what I intend to begin to do here by suggesting some further thoughts on Amerindian perspectivism, a theme with which I have been occupied (or perhaps obsessed) over the last few years.2