Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two-Level Game

The article focuses on public opinion as a policy-relevant imperative in negotiators’ two-level games, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, it highlights two characteristics of public opinion: its multifaceted nature and its susceptibility to framing efforts. The two are related in the sense that they provide negotiators with opportunities to shape their own and the other side’s win-sets: the sets of possible agreements that will gain majority support among their constituents. Both characteristics are exemplified using data from joint Palestinian-Israeli surveys focusing on two of the most difficult issues in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute: the recognition of the Palestinian refugees’ right of return by Israelis and the recognition of the Jewish identity of Israel by Palestinians. First, the study shows how framing a solution to the Palestinian refugees’ problem as the implementation or surrender of the right of return greatly affects respondents’ support for it. The article then discusses the implications of constructive ambiguity and framing for negotiators. Next it demonstrates the utility of a multifaceted approach to public opinion research in detecting pluralistic ignorance and mutual misperceptions on the issue of Israel’s national identity, pointing again to the implications of these conditions for policy-makers involved in two-level games.

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