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Social Choice Theory in HOL Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite

This article presents formalizations in higher-order logic of two proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem due to Geanakoplos. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is derived as a corollary. Lacunae found in the literature are discussed.

Tobias Nipkow | T. Nipkow

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