Orchestrating Information Acquisition

We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates (“types”) about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential short-listing rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully sequential, at each round, the most efficient remaining bidder is admitted provided that her conditional expected contribution to the virtual surplus is positive. (JEL D44, D82, D83)

[1]  Alex Gershkov,et al.  A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations , 2018, Journal of Political Economy.

[2]  Jingfeng Lu,et al.  Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007) , 2020 .

[3]  Ilya Segal,et al.  Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation , 2020, Journal of Political Economy.

[4]  Yunan Li,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition , 2017, Journal of Economics Theory.

[5]  Leonardo Rezende.  Mid-auction information acquisition , 2018 .

[6]  Laura Doval,et al.  Whether or not to open Pandora's box , 2018, J. Econ. Theory.

[7]  Kenneth Hendricks,et al.  A Theory of Indicative Bidding , 2018 .

[8]  Joosung Lee,et al.  Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline , 2018 .

[9]  Mengxi Zhang.  Auctions vs. Negotiations: Optimal Selling Mechanism with Endogenous Bidder Values , 2017 .

[10]  Hao Li,et al.  Discriminatory Information Disclosure , 2017 .

[11]  Navin Kartik,et al.  Optimal Contracts for Experimentation , 2016 .

[12]  E. Glen Weyl,et al.  Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search , 2016, EC.

[13]  Richard Weber,et al.  A more general Pandora rule? , 2015, J. Econ. Theory.

[14]  P. Jehiel,et al.  On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry , 2015 .

[15]  Achim Wambach,et al.  Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions , 2013, J. Econ. Theory.

[16]  I. Segal,et al.  Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach , 2014 .

[17]  Balázs Szentes,et al.  Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result , 2014 .

[18]  Lixin Ye,et al.  Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs , 2013, J. Econ. Theory.

[19]  Tong Li,et al.  Identification in Auctions with Selective Entry , 2012 .

[20]  Xianwen Shi,et al.  Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[21]  Nora Szech,et al.  Optimal advertising of auctions , 2011, J. Econ. Theory.

[22]  James W. Roberts,et al.  When Should Sellers Use Auctions? , 2011 .

[23]  Roland Strausz,et al.  Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning , 2011 .

[24]  Guoqiang Tian,et al.  Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..

[25]  Pai Xu,et al.  What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach , 2010 .

[26]  Jingfeng Lu,et al.  Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information Acquisition , 2010 .

[27]  Jingfeng Lu,et al.  Auction design with opportunity cost , 2009 .

[28]  Péter Eso,et al.  Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction , 2007 .

[29]  Jacques Crémer,et al.  Optimal search auctions , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[30]  David McAdams,et al.  Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool , 2007 .

[31]  J. Crémer,et al.  Auctions with costly information acquisition , 2007 .

[32]  Lixin Ye,et al.  Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[33]  Okan Yilankaya,et al.  Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.

[34]  P. Jehiel,et al.  Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? , 2007 .

[35]  Dirk Bergemann,et al.  Information in Mechanism Design , 2005 .

[36]  Lixin Ye.  Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry , 2004 .

[37]  Paul Milgrom,et al.  Putting Auction Theory to Work , 2004 .

[38]  J. Foley.  Multi-round auctions for institutional real estate assets : theory and practice , 2003 .

[39]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets , 2002 .

[40]  P. Monteiro,et al.  Auctions with endogenous participation , 2000 .

[41]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Optimal auctions revisited , 1998, Artif. Intell..

[42]  N. Persico.  Information acquisition in auctions , 2000 .

[43]  Marc A. Vallen,et al.  The Due Diligence Process for Acquiring and Building Power Plants , 1999 .

[44]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctionin Entry into Tournaments , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[45]  Colin M. Campbell.  Coordination in Auctions with Entry , 1998 .

[46]  P. Courty,et al.  Sequential Screening , 1998 .

[47]  M. Stegeman.  Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions , 1996 .

[48]  Dan Levin,et al.  Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry , 1994 .

[49]  Guofu Tan,et al.  Entry and R & D in procurement contracting , 1992 .

[50]  Richard P. McLean,et al.  FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS , 1988 .

[51]  M. Riordan,et al.  Awarding Monopoly Franchises , 1987 .

[52]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions with entry , 1987 .

[53]  William Samuelson.  Competitive bidding with entry costs , 1985 .

[54]  D. P. Baron,et al.  Regulation and information in a continuing relationship , 1984 .

[55]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[56]  M. Weitzman.  Optimal search for the best alternative , 1978 .