论文信息 - Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundacion Empresa Publica)

Roberto Serrano | Rajiv Vohra

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