Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery

The paper presents a stochastic differential game model of a common-property commercial fishery and determines a feedback Nash equilibrium of the game. Closed-form expressions for the value functions, the equilibrium harvesting strategies, and stationary distributions of the fish stock are derived. Sensitivity analyses with respect tot he model parameters are carried out. The paper also considers equilibrium outcomes under joint maximization and surplus maximization. In the latter case, an optimal market size (i.e., number of firms) is identified.

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