A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards

he main focus of this paper is to analyzethe mainstream academic thoughts onthe roles of governing boards. Six majorroles are identified: linking, coordinating,control, strategic, maintenance and supportroles. These roles are consistent with, andat the same time reflecting one of themain arguments of six different schools ofthoughts: resource dependency theory, stake-holder theory, agency theory, stewardship theory,institutional theory and managerial hegemony.A classification of the relationship betweenthese theories and the six identified roles ismade by using a typological approach. Thetypological parameters used are extrinsic andintrinsic influences, the impact of externaland internal environments, as well as func-tional and behavioural approaches. Thetypology gives rise to the need of a newtheory on the roles and functions of govern-ing boards.

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