Defending Against Terrorism, Natural Disaster, and All Hazards

This chapter considers both natural disasters and terrorism as threats. The defender chooses tradeoffs between investments in protection against natural disaster only, protection against terrorism only, and all-hazards protection. The terrorist chooses strategically how fiercely to attack. Three kinds of games are considered: when the agents move simultaneously; when the defender moves first; and when the terrorist moves first. Conditions are shown for when each type of agent prefers each kind of game. Sometimes their preferences for games coincide, but often their preferences are opposite. An agent advantaged with a sufficiently low normalized unit cost of investment relative to that of its opponent prefers to move first, which deters the opponent entirely, causing maximum utility for the first mover and zero utility to the deterred second mover, who prefers to avoid this game. When all-hazards protection is sufficiently cheap, it jointly protects against both the natural disaster and terrorism. As the cost increases, either pure natural disaster protection or pure terrorism protection joins in, dependent on which is more cost effective. As the unit cost of all-hazards protection increases above the sum of the individual unit costs, the extent of such protection drops to zero, and the pure forms of natural disaster protection and terrorism protection take over.

[1]  K. Menninger On war. , 1973, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic.

[2]  Kjell Hausken,et al.  Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange , 2004 .

[3]  Ross J. Anderson Why information security is hard - an economic perspective , 2001, Seventeenth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.

[4]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Game-Theoretic and Reliability Methods in Counterterrorism and Security , 2006 .

[5]  Larry Samuelson,et al.  Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker , 2005 .

[6]  S. Skaperdas Contest success functions , 1996 .

[7]  K. Hausken Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory , 2002, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[8]  Pedro C. Diniz,et al.  Compilation Techniques for Reconfigurable Architectures , 2008 .

[9]  V. Bier,et al.  Perfect aggregation for a class of general reliability models with Bayesian updating , 1995 .

[10]  R. Tollison,et al.  Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society , 1982 .

[11]  K. Hausken Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment , 2006 .

[12]  J. Hirshleifer From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods , 1983 .

[13]  K. Hausken Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models , 2005 .

[14]  J. Hirshleifer Anarchy and its Breakdown , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.

[15]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Optimal Allocation of Resources for Defense of Simple Series and Parallel Systems from Determined Adversaries , 2003 .

[16]  G. Tullock Efficient Rent Seeking , 2001 .

[17]  H. Kunreuther,et al.  Interdependent Security , 2003 .

[18]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Protection of simple series and parallel systems with components of different values , 2005, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[19]  E. Rasmussen Games and Information , 1989 .

[20]  M. Naceur Azaiez,et al.  Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems , 2007, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[21]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters - Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort , 2007, Oper. Res..