A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria

We present a Coq-formalized proof that all non-cooperative, sequential games have a Nash equilibrium point. Our proof methodology follows the style advocated by LCF-style theorem provers, i.e., it is based on inductive definitions and is computational in nature. The proof (i) uses simple computational means, only, (ii) basically is by construction, and (iii) reaches a constructively stronger conclusion than informal efforts. We believe the development is a first as far as formalized game theory goes.

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