Persistent parochialism: trust and exclusion in ethnic networks

Decentralized groups such as close knit residential neighborhoods and ethnically linked businesses often achieve high levels of cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices that we call parochialism. We investigate the contribution of within-group cultural affinity to the ability of parochial groups to cooperate in social dilemmas. We analyze parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders. We show that there is a range of degrees of parochialism for which parochial networks can coexist with an anonymous market offering unrestricted trading opportunities.

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