Lobbying under political uncertainty

Abstract This paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game; it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge. We characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies; we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence. We also offer some results for the general case, including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient.

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