Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games

In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Barabási–Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network is fixed. Here we introduce exogenous random fluctuations of the network links through several noise models, and we investigate the evolutionary dynamics comparing them with the known static network case. The results we obtain show that even a moderate amount of random noise on the network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is the same as the agents' strategy revision rate. The results appear to be robust since they are essentially the same whatever the type of the exogenous noise. Besides, it turns out that random network noise is more important than strategy noise in suppressing cooperation. Thus, even in the more favorable situation of accumulated payoff in which links have no cost, the mere presence of random external network fluctuations act as a powerful limitation to the attainment of high levels of cooperation.

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