论文信息 - Chapter 36 Games in coalitional form

Chapter 36 Games in coalitional form

15. Summary This chapter has had two principal purposes. One was to develop the idea of the “coalitional function” of a cooperative game as a means of abstracting from given settings (pure exchange economies, strategic-form games, political games, and the like) the possibilities available to the various coalitions through player cooperation. The other was to present several classes of games (market games, simple games, convex games, symmetric games) on which attention will be focused in subsequent chapters, and to provide several tools (covers and extensions, contractions and reductions, and the like) which will be useful in further analysis.

Robert J. Weber | R. Weber

[1] Robert J. Weber. Attainable Sets of Markets: An Overview , 1980 .

[2] Bezalel Peleg,et al. ON WEIGHTS OF CONSTANT-SUM MAJORITY GAMES. , 1968 .

[3] S. Hart,et al. Potential, value, and consistency , 1989 .

[4] A. Mas-Colell. A further result on the representation of games by markets , 1975 .

[5] G. Owen. Multilinear Extensions of Games , 1972 .

[6] J. Harsanyi. A bargaining model for the cooperative n-person game , 1958 .

[7] L. Shapley,et al. Values of Non-Atomic Games , 1974 .

[8] E. Lapidot. The counting vector of a simple game , 1972 .

[9] L. Shapley,et al. ON MARKET GAMES , 1969, Classics in Game Theory.

[10] The Shapley value: Weighted Shapley values , 1988 .

[11] J. Neumann,et al. Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.