Generalized English Auctions by Relaxation in Dynamic Distributed CSPs with Private Constraints

Certain classes of negotiation problems lend themselves to strategies ensuring that no agent can gain by lying. Truth incentive protocols, among which Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) is one of the most famous, can then be used to centrally compute fair and e‐cient solutions. However, for problems that allow no truth incentive protocols (e.g. problems with false name bids), English Auctions are prefered to GVA. In this paper we show how the framework of Distributed Constraint Satisfaction (DisCSP) with private constraints can be extended for modeling and solving negotiation problems such as English Auctions with multipleitems where bids can correspond to complex actions (selling, buying, or both).

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