Abstract : Private contractors have become an essential but highly problematic element in the U.S. military s total force structure. The Army in particular relies heavily on contractors to perform duties that free up Soldiers for combat roles. The vast majority of these civilian employees provide logistical and technical support. They build facilities, do laundry, and staff dining halls on U.S. bases at home and abroad. While some of these contractors have been involved in issues of waste, fraud, and abuse, these issues do not have a significant effect on the conduct of contingency operations, especially counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. The same cannot be said of a small subset of military contractors known as private military security contractors (PMSCs). PMSCs provide armed security personnel to support contingency operations abroad. They provide heavily armed personal security details for the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), construction contractors, nongovernmental and international organizations (NGOs and IOs), and even private individuals. They also supply static security guards for bases and other facilities, and escort supply convoys in conflict zones. These activities have embroiled them in escalation-of-force and other incidents that have undermined mission goals and objectives. Reigning in security contractors thus presents a major challenge for the U.S. Government in general and the Army in particular. This monograph examines the role of PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to derive general lessons on employment of security contractors in future contingency operations, particularly COIN campaigns. Three broad questions underlie this analysis. First, what tasks can be safely outsourced to private companies? Second, how should the government manage contractors in conflict zones?
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