GNSS Receiver Identification Using Clock-Derived Metrics †

Falsifying Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data with a simulator or with a fake receiver can have a significant economic or safety impact in many transportation applications where Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) are used to enforce a regulation. In this context, the authentication of the source of the PVT data (i.e., the GNSS receiver) is a requirement since data faking can become a serious threat. Receiver fingerprinting techniques represent possible countermeasures to verify the authenticity of a GNSS receiver and of its data. Herein, the potential of clock-derived metrics for GNSS receiver fingerprinting is investigated, and a filter approach is implemented for feature selection. Novel experimental results show that three intrinsic features are sufficient to identify a receiver. Moreover, the adopted technique is time effective as data blocks of about 40 min are sufficient to produce stable features for fingerprinting.

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