Incentivizing for Truth Discovery in Edge-assisted Large-scale Mobile Crowdsensing

The recent development of human-carried mobile devices has promoted the great development of mobile crowdsensing systems. Most existing mobile crowdsensing systems depend on the crowdsensing service of the deep cloud. With the increasing scale and complexity, there is a tendency to enhance mobile crowdsensing with the edge computing paradigm to reduce latency and computational complexity, and improve the expandability and security. In this paper, we propose an integrated solution to stimulate the strategic users to contribute more for truth discovery in the edge-assisted mobile crowdsensing. We design an incentive mechanism consisting of truth discovery stage and budget feasible reverse auction stage. In truth discovery stage, we estimate the truth for each task in both deep cloud and edge cloud. In budget feasible reverse auction stage, we design a greedy algorithm to select the winners to maximize the quality function under the budget constraint. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is computationally efficient, individually rational, truthful, budget feasible and constant approximate. Moreover, the proposed mechanism shows great superiority in terms of estimation precision and expandability.

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