Optimal Timing and Legal Decisionmaking: The Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy

Until the firm is sold or a plan of reorganization is confirmed, Chapter 11 entrusts a judge with the decision of whether to keep a firm as a going concern or to shut it down. The judge revisits this liquidation decision multiple times. The key is to make the correct decision at the optimal time. This paper models this decision as the exercise of a real option and shows that it depends critically on particular types of information about the firm and its industry. Liquidations take place too soon if we merely compare the liquidation value of the assets with the expected earnings of the firm. Moreover, existing law undermines effective decisionmaking. Even though the judge makes the liquidation decision, a number of rules prevent the judge from controlling the timing of the decision, and those who do control it lack the incentive to ensure it is made at the optimal time. The paper introduces a framework that can illuminate many areas of law, such as summary judgment motions, parole, and agency rule making.

[1]  D. Baird,et al.  The Law and Economics of Contract Damages , 1995 .

[2]  Gary S. Becker,et al.  The Economic Way of Looking at Life , 1992 .

[3]  D. Baird,et al.  Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 , 1993, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[4]  Richard A. Epstein,et al.  Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting It Back Together Again* , 2000, Social Philosophy and Policy.

[5]  P. Bernholz,et al.  Public Choice , 2018, The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1.

[6]  A. Sykes An Introduction to Regression Analysis , 1993 .

[7]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  DO People Want Optimal Deterrence? , 2000, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[8]  J. Mark Ramseyer,et al.  Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System , 1993 .

[9]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study , 1993, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[10]  Randal C. Picker An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law , 1994 .

[11]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract , 1993 .

[12]  Lisa E. Bernstein ‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study , 1999 .

[13]  J. Mark Ramseyer,et al.  Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages: Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan , 1993 .

[14]  C. Sunstein,et al.  Cognition And Cost‐Benefit Analysis , 1999, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[15]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special Reference to Law and Economics , 1999 .

[16]  Randal C. Picker,et al.  Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel , 1999 .

[17]  David A. Weisbach,et al.  Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law , 1998 .

[18]  Richard A. Epstein Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law through the Lens of Laissez-Faire , 2020, The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract.

[19]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) , 1998 .

[20]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  Community, Wealth, and Equality , 1997 .

[21]  John R. Lott,et al.  Does a Helping Hand Put Others at Risk?: Affirmative Action, Police Departments, and Crime , 2000 .

[22]  John R. Lott,et al.  Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism , 1998 .

[23]  Richard A. Epstein,et al.  The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle , 1994 .

[24]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  The Cost-Benefit State , 1996 .

[25]  Geoffrey P. Miller,et al.  Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation , 1996, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[26]  Christine Jolls,et al.  A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics , 1998 .

[27]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  OPTIMAL REGULATION OF AIDS , 1992 .

[28]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles , 1996 .

[29]  Yannis Bakos,et al.  Shared Information Goods , 1999 .

[30]  Kenneth W. Dam The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law , 1994, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[31]  David B. Mustard,et al.  Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed Handguns , 1997, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[32]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Rules and Rulelessness , 1994 .

[33]  E. Glaeser,et al.  Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens? , 1998 .

[34]  John R. Lott,et al.  Punitive Damages: Their Determinants, Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional Attempts to Limit Awards , 1998 .

[35]  Alan O. Sykes,et al.  The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law , 1995 .

[36]  Michael E. Solimine,et al.  Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges , 1998, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[37]  Kenneth W. Dam Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise , 1999 .

[38]  John R. Lott,et al.  How Dramatically Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government? , 1998 .

[39]  John R. Lott,et al.  A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger , 1999 .

[40]  David A. Weisbach,et al.  Ironing Out the Flat Tax , 2000 .

[41]  W. Landes,et al.  Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz Collection , 1999, Recherches économiques de Louvain.

[42]  R. Epstein,et al.  Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? , 1997 .

[43]  C. Sunstein,et al.  Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward a 'Third Way' , 1999 .

[44]  J. Mark Ramseyer,et al.  Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan , 1996 .

[45]  M. Adler,et al.  Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis , 1999 .

[46]  John R. Lott,et al.  Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement , 1999 .

[47]  William M. Landes,et al.  The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay , 1997 .

[48]  Randal C. Picker Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms , 1997 .

[49]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages , 1999 .

[50]  William M. Landes,et al.  Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach , 1992, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[51]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence , 1999 .

[52]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically , 1999 .

[53]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law , 1998 .

[54]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment , 1999 .

[55]  Randal C. Picker,et al.  Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital , 1993 .

[56]  E. Posner,et al.  A Theory of Customary International Law , 1998 .

[57]  D. Baird,et al.  The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and Economics of Financially Distressed Firms , 1997 .

[58]  Chicago Unbound,et al.  What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thin gs Everyone Else Does) , 1993 .

[59]  Kenneth W. Dam Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software , 1995, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[60]  William M. Landes,et al.  Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis , 1993, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[61]  Daniel N. Shaviro Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime Consumption , 1995 .

[62]  Eric A. Posner,et al.  A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error , 1999 .

[63]  John R. Lott,et al.  Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs , 1999 .

[64]  Richard Craswell,et al.  Freedom of Contract , 1995 .

[65]  C. Sunstein Social Norms and Social Roles , 1995 .

[66]  John R. Lott,et al.  Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California’s state legislative races , 1997 .

[67]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Behavioral Law and Economics: Second-Order Decisions , 2000 .