When a 12.86% Mortality is More Dangerous than 24.14%: Implications for Risk Communication

SUMMARY Participants assessed the riskiness of 11 well-known causes of death. Each participant was presented with an estimation of the number of deaths in the population due to that particular cause. The estimates were obtained from a previous study of naive participants’ intuitive estimations. For instance, based on the result of the previous study, the number of deaths due to cancer was presented as: ‘2,414 out of 10,000’, ‘1,286 out of 10,000’, ‘24.14 out of 100’ and ‘12.86 out of 100’. The estimates of deaths were presented in analogous ways for the remaining ten causes of death. It was hypothesized that the judged degree of riskiness is affected by the number of deaths, irrespective of the total possible number (such as 10,000 or 100). Results from Experiment 1 were consistent with this prediction. Participants rated cancer as riskier when it was described as ‘kills 1,286 out of 10,000 people’ than as ‘kills 24.14 out of 100 people’, and similar results were observed regarding the remaining 10 causes of death. Experiment 2 replicated this trend. Implications for risk communications are discussed. & 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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