Combining Bayesian Belief Networks and the Goal Structuring Notation to Support Architectural Reasoning About Safety

There have been an increasing number of applications of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) for predicting safety properties in an attempt to handle the obstacles of uncertainty and complexity present in modern software development. Yet there is little practical guidance on justifying the use of BBN models for the purpose of safety. In this paper, we propose a compositional and semi-automated approach to reasoning about safety properties of architectures. This approach consists of compositional failure analysis through applying the object-oriented BBN framework. We also show that producing sound safety arguments for BBN-based deviation analysis results can help understand the implications of analysis results and identify new safety problems. The feasibility of the proposed approach is demonstrated by means of a case study.

[1]  David Heckerman,et al.  A Tutorial on Learning with Bayesian Networks , 1999, Innovations in Bayesian Networks.

[2]  Pamela Zave,et al.  Deriving Specifications from Requirements: an Example , 1995, 1995 17th International Conference on Software Engineering.

[3]  Alistair G. Sutcliffe,et al.  Scenario-based assessment of nonfunctional requirements , 2005, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.

[4]  J. Pearl.  Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference , 2000 .

[5]  Carmen Lacave,et al.  A review of explanation methods for Bayesian networks , 2002, The Knowledge Engineering Review.

[6]  Avi Pfeffer,et al.  Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks , 1997, UAI.

[7]  Paul Clements,et al.  Software architecture in practice , 1999, SEI series in software engineering.

[8]  Norman E. Fenton,et al.  A Critique of Software Defect Prediction Models , 1999, IEEE Trans. Software Eng..

[9]  Tim Kelly,et al.  Safety tactics for software architecture design , 2004, Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference, 2004. COMPSAC 2004..

[10]  Shailey Minocha,et al.  An impact analysis method for safety-critical user interface design , 1999, TCHI.

[11]  Judea Pearl,et al.  Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems - networks of plausible inference , 1991, Morgan Kaufmann series in representation and reasoning.

[12]  J. A. McDermid,et al.  Towards integrated safety analysis and design , 1994, SIAP.

[13]  Tim Kelly,et al.  Failure modelling in software architecture design for safety , 2005, ACM SIGSOFT Softw. Eng. Notes.

[14]  Carroll Morgan,et al.  Of Probabilistic Wp and SP-and Compositionality , 2004, 25 Years Communicating Sequential Processes.

[15]  John A. McDermid,et al.  A systematic approach to safety case maintenance , 1999, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[16]  David Heckerman,et al.  Learning With Bayesian Networks (Abstract) , 1995, ICML.

[17]  Tim Kelly.  A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Management , 2004 .

[18]  John A. McDermid,et al.  Experience with the application of HAZOP to computer-based systems , 1995, COMPASS '95 Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Computer Assurance Systems Integrity, Software Safety and Process Security'.