论文信息 - Reliable Belief Revision

Reliable Belief Revision

Philosophical logicians proposing theories of rational belief revision have had little to say about whether their proposals assist or impede the agent’s ability to reliably arrive at the truth as his beliefs change through time. On the other hand, reliability is the central concern of formal learning theory. In this paper we investigate the belief revision theory of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson from a learning theoretic point of view.

Kevin T. Kelly | Oliver Schulte | Vincent F. Hendricks | O. Schulte | V. Hendricks

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